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ABSTRACT 
The diffusion patterns of 3G cellular technologies indicate that the reality is not matching the optimistic estimates of 
various consulting firms regarding the size of the network. What factors influence the diffusion of rapidly developing 
network goods? This paper draws upon innovation diffusion literature and the early experiences of 3G mobile 
technologies to examine the influence of supply-side factors on the 3G diffusion trajectory. We also propose a model 
that classifies various 3G related attributes in terms of their influence on present utility vs. expected future utility and 
the mechanism of influence: via 3G device vs. via 3G network. The central argument of this paper is that while the 
breadth of offers has been wider in 3G compared to lower generation cellular technologies, there has been digression 
rather than progress on some dimensions (e.g., bulky 3G handsets, very short battery lives, small geographical coverage, 
and lower network externality effects). The problems are compounded by the lack of strategic pricing and industry-
regulator coordinations.  
 
Keywords: 3G mobile communications, diffusion, supply-side, technology attributes, upgradability, utility of network 
goods  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The diffusion patterns of 3G cellular technologies 
indicate that the reality is not matching the optimistic 
estimates of various consulting firms. The early 
experience in Europe and Asia-Pacific indicates dismal 
consumer response to 3G mobile communications. For 
instance, Hutchison 3G (H3G), which launched 3G 
services in the UK and Italy in March 2003, had set a 
target of target of 1 million subscribers in each country 
by December 2003. The company achieved only 30% 
of its target in Italy and 21% in U.K. by that time 
(Table 1).  
 
This paper draws upon innovation diffusion literature 
and the early experiences in Europe and Asia to 
explore the connection between attributes of a 
technology and its diffusion pattern. Although we 
focus on 3G, the issues examined in this paper have 
broad implications technology marketers.  
 
2. SUPPLY SIDE OF TECHNOLOGY 
DIFFUSION: RELEVANT THEORIES 
 
The existing literature indicates that supply side factors 
that influence diffusion of network goods include price, 
breadth and depth of technology products, complexity, 
positioning, government-supplier coordination and 
modularity and upgrdability, degree of supply 
abundance and expected size of the network (Table 2). 
It should, however, be noted that these factors are not 
necessarily orthogonal. In the case of network goods 
such as 3G mobile communications, some of these 
factors are more relevant to the device whereas others 
are more relevant to the network. These attributes can 
also have differential impact on the perception of 
present utility and expected future utility. Table 3 
classifies the attributes in two dimensions: devise 
specific vs. network specific and present utility vs. 
expected future utility.  
 
The demand for a network good is a function of the 
expected size of the network (Katz and Shapiro 1994). 
Too small new market may result in the failure of a 
new technology (Lin 2003). The expected size of the 
network is a function of various factors including price 
of the technology product, quality, degree of 
compatibility with previous generations of 
technologies, and upgradabality.   
 
Suppliers can modify product characteristics and price 
structure to fit the needs of a market segment 
(Robertson and Gatignon 1986). The price of a 
technology influences consumers’ adoption timing 
(Kamakura and Balasubramanian 1988) and the rate of 
adoption (Jain and Rao 1990) at the micro-level and for 
a network good, the demand and the market potential 
(Kalish and Lilien 1986; Katz and Shapiro 1994) at the 
macro-level. Since the network externality is positively 
related to the network size, the number of users has a 
higher significance than the intensity of use for 
network goods. For networks that require two part fees, 
a reduction of the fixed component is thus a more 
appropriate way to stimulate the growth of the network 
than a reduction in variable costs (Perrot 1995). 
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Table 1: 3G Mobile networks in selected economies 
 Hong Kong  Japan  Italy  U.K. 
Launched in  January, 2004 September 2001 March 2003 March 2003 
Service 
provider(s) 
and 
technology  
H3G (W-CDMA) DoCoMo (W-CDMA) 
KDDI (CDMA) 
H3G (W-CDMA) H3G (W-CDMA) 
Number of 
subscribers 
(Date) 
3,000 (February 1, 
2004) 
DoCoMo: 2 million (January, 
2004) 
KDDI: 13 million (October 
2003) 
210,000 (December 
2003) 
300,000 (January 
2004) 
ARPU  US$77.8 (October-December 
2001) 
Euro 79 (2003)  
 
Mason’s (1990) study, on the other hand, provided 
empirical support that product attributes and not cost 
affect the adoption decision. For rapidly developing 
technologies such as mobile phones, modularity and 
upgradability have a strong impact on the diffusion 
pattern. Rosenberg (1982) found that if a technology is 
upgradable, it allows a firm to offer product 
innovations continually that users can integrate into 
their current product configuration. He argues that 
users will be reluctant to purchase products that cannot 
be upgraded and rapid technological change further 
increases the reluctance since their investments become 
obsolete under such conditions (Rosenberg 1982). 
Upgradability is found to be one of the major factors 
that influence the selection of a desktop computer. PC 
buyers are concerned about the possibility of upgrading 
the processor, adding the memory, availability of drive 
bays for additional hard drives (Grier and Bryant 1998). 
Product standardization and modular upgradability also 
affect and are affected by network externality and 
compatibility requirements (Kotabe et al. 1996). 
 
Table 2: Supply side factors influencing the diffusion of network goods 
Factor  Impact on innovation diffusion  The case of 3G  
 
Expected size of network  
(NS) 
Influence network externality effects  • Incompatibility with lower generation phones 
and PCs. 
• Too small coverage in some countries 
Modularity and  
Upgradability (MU) 
Allows users to integrate innovations 
continually  
Cellular technologies lack consumer-level 
upgradability  
Price (PR) Influences: 
• Adoption timing 
• Rate of adoption 
• Market potential 
• Higher prices. Suppliers focused more on 
reducing variables prices (VPR).  
Number of 
versions/standards (NV)    
Multiple versions/standards increase 
complexity  
Uncertain standards and complexities of 3G 
applications  
Degree of supply-
abundance  (SA) 
Slow growing and fast declining 
diffusion pattern under supply restriction.  
Shortage of 3G handsets  
Depth and breadth (DB)  Increase choice and value  3G has a wide breadth of uses 
Industry-government 
coordination  (IG) 
Inadequate coordination leads to failure. • Market fragmentation 
• Supply-side crowd  
• Unrealistic expectations of governments  
Communication/promotion 
(CP) 
Positioning influences attractiveness.  H3G’s confused positioning  
Other characteristics (OC)  Size, battery life, reliability of devices and network, 
etc.   
Communication/promotion 
(CP) 
Positioning influences attractiveness.  H3G’s confused positioning  
Other characteristics (OC)  Size, battery life, reliability of devices and network, 
etc.   
Modular upgradability and its benefits are also 
illustrated by Sun’s SPARCstation 10 series. 
SPARCstation enables users to increase system 
performance by plugging in faster microprocessors and 
memory modules as they become available. 
SPARCstation 10 series can also be upgraded easily to 
multiple processing and other future technologies. The 
SPARCstation 10 provided integrated services digital 
network (ISDN) capabilities as a built-in feature. 
Moreover, SPARC modules and bus architecture can 
accommodate advances in microprocessors technology.  
Sun also offered “no penalty upgrades” to its users-- 
the price of an upgrade plus user investment in an 
existing system would be equal to the price of a new 
system (Garud and Kumaraswamy 1993). 
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Inadequate coordination among firms and governments 
is another source of failure of a new technology (Lin 
2003). The failure will also imply the inappropriateness 
of the industrial policy to other firms and they can 
avoid that failure by not following the policy (Lin 
2003). The diffusion pattern of telecom-related 
products is also a function of the focus of national 
industrial and technological policies on fostering and 
strengthening this sector (Beise 2001, p. 263).  
 
The degree of supply-abundance also influences the 
shape of diffusion curves. For instance, Simon and 
Sebastian (1987) found that a diffusion curve exhibits 
slow growing and fast declining (that is, negatively 
skewed) pattern under conditions of supply restriction.  
 
Past research has also found that variety and 
uncertainty of multiple versions increase complexity 
(Frizelle 1998). A technology’s possibility of forking 
into numerous versions increases the uncertainty. For 
instance, UNIX in the 1970s was broken into several 
proprietary formats (Kogut and Metiu 2001), which 
increased its complexity.   
 
In the case of radical innovations, firms with greater 
depth and breadth in their product portfolio tend to be 
more successful (Sorescu et al. 2003). Broader and 
deeper product portfolio increases consumer choice 
and hence value of technologies offered by a company. 
For instance, breadth of product line is found to be 
positively related to consumers’ workstation purchase 
decisions (Kaplan 1991).  
 
Suppliers can also influence the adoption rate of a 
product by communicating ideas through advertising 
and promotion (Narasimhan and Mendez 2001; Rogers 
1995) and setting fashions (Abrahamson 1996). Like 
all other products underpositioning, overpositioning, 
confused positioning and doubtful positioning (Kotler 
2003, p. 311) will slow down the adoption rate. 
 
Table 3: A two-dimensional representation of 
supply side factors influencing 3G diffusion 
 Present Utility Expected Future 
Utility 
Device Specific PR, DB, CP, NV, 
OC (Size, battery 
life, reliability of 
device, etc.).  
MU, NV, FPR, 
OC (Size, battery 
life, reliability of 
device, etc.).  
Network Specific PR, DB, CP, OC 
(e.g., reliability of 
network).  
NS, FPR, OC 
(e.g., reliability of 
network).  
 
3. SUPPLY-SIDE FACTORS INFLUENCING 
THE DIFFUSION OF 3G MOBILE 
COMMUNICATIONS  
 
3G cellular technologies are characterized by different 
types of network externality compared to lower 
generations. Whereas second generation (2G) phones 
could communicate with first generation (1G) phones 
as well as with fixed phones, this is not the case with 
3G phones. Only 3G devices can exploit combined 
voice/picture capabilities of 3G networks and lower 
generation mobile phones and many PCs could be 
excluded from such application networks (Lehrer et al. 
2002). Limited geographical coverage in most 
countries has exacerbated the problem. Lack of 
coverage hindered the initial success of FOMA in 
Japan, NTT DoCoMo's 3G service launched in October 
2001. In Italy and the U.K., H3G’s coverage started 
with half the population (Norton, Leslie P 2002). Even 
by the early 2004, H3G offered 3G services to only 
55% of the Italian population (Taaffe 2004).  
 
In a survey conducted by ChangeWave Alliance, the 
Number 1 concern about 3G services of 18% of the 
respondents was too expensive services and that of 
another 4% was too expensive handsets. Consider the 
prices of 3G handsets. In Korea, SK Telecom and KTF 
had set the price of 3G handsets from US$581-$830 in 
2003(Business CustomWire, December 28, 2003). In 
U.K., immediately after the launch of 3G 
services,H3Ghad to reduce the price of its handsets by 
half to pounds 199  which was still much higher 
compared with the "free" phones offered by 2G 
operators to those signing up to their monthly plans 
(Economist.com 2003).  
 
Not only the fixed costs but also variables costs of 3G 
are expensive. Higher average revenue per user 
(ARPU) of 3G services reflects unattractive variable 
costs. In Italy, for instance, ARPU from 3G services 
was Euro 79 per month in 2003 which compares with 
2G ARPU of euro27 in Europe (Taaffe 2004). In Japan, 
NTT DoCoMo reported that the mean 3G revenue per 
user in April – June, 2002 was $65.43 a month (Georgi 
2002). In July 2003, 3’s UK customers spent an 
average of £45 a month -much higher than its rivals’ 
£25-£35 (Payton and Bowen 2003). 
 
In an attempt to make 3G services more attractive, the 
operators have reduced variables costs for some 
attributes. In U.K. a  new tariff introduced by 
Hutchison 3G in June 2003, offered subscribers 500 
minutes for $40 per month, which compares with the 
plans of the incumbent 2G operators which averages 
$72 for 400 minutes (The Economist, September 20, 
2003). In Hong Kong, Hutchison offers three basic 
service plans to customers at monthly charges of 
US$34 (Business CustomWire, January 19, 2004). To 
stimulate 2G consumers to sign up, NTT DoCoMo cut 
3G fees by up to 55% for existing subscribers 
(Kakenaka 2002).  
 
The wide breadth of uses of 3G has not translated into 
improvement on each dimension. In the ChangeWave 
Alliance survey, 4% respondents were concerned about 
current technology’s capability to carry high-quality 
calls (Business CustomWire, November 19, 2003). 
Subscribers complain of lost calls, bulky handsets that 
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were awkward to handle and inadequate battery life. In 
Italy, 15% of early customers took their handsets back 
(Payton and Bowen 2003). 
 
H3G's pre-launch brand-building campaign, designed 
to “cultivate curiosity” could not achieve its goal 
(Payton and Bowen 2003). Hutchison also made too 
many claims and too frequent change of the positioning 
of its brand, resulting in confused positioning.  
Hutchison, for instance, first launched a huge 
advertising campaign promoting the video capabilities 
and high-speed internet access of 3G handsets. In 
September 2003, Hutchison started promoting its 3G 
services as the cheapest ways to make voice calls 
instead of touting advanced features such as 
videoconferencing and Web-browsing (The Economist, 
September 20, 2003, Ramstad et al. 2003). In fact, the 
killer application of 3G has become voice 
communications (Payton and Bowen 2003). 
 
In the ChangeWave Alliance survey, the number 1 
concern about 3G services of 17% of the respondents 
was the reliability of technology and equipment 
(Business CustomWire, November 19, 2003). Many 
3G subscribers are reported to carry their 2G handsets 
as back-ups. Hutchison 3G mobile in Australia 
received several complaints of calls dropping out not 
being able to deliver video and Internet service on the 
3G handsets (Business CustomWire, December 28, 
2003).  
The slow growing diffusion pattern of 3G is can also 
be attributed to the shortage of 3G ready handsets 
(Business CustomWire, December 2, 2003). Hutchison 
also failed to launch the pre-pay service due the lack of 
suitable handsets. Vendors like Nokia, Motorola, and 
Ericsson could not ease the supply-side bottlenecks to 
ensure the availability 3G ready handsets for W-
CDMA services. Even 2.5G handsets were seriously 
delayed by Nokia (Reinhardt et al. 2001). 
 
Many operators around the world enjoy supplier-level 
upgradability in the cellular network. Economies with 
CDMA-based 2G networks such as South Korea, 
Brazil, India and Mexico can easily upgrade to 3G in 
the form of CDMA2000  (The Economist 2002). 
Thanks to its CDMA-based 2G standard, South Korea 
was able to launch the 3G network as early as in 2000. 
Consumer benefit of the supplier-level upgradability in 
the cellular network, however, has been minimal. 
Consumers, for instance, are required to buy a new 
handset for 3G services. 2G handsets thus cannot be 
upgraded. There is thus no “no penalty upgrades” 
(Garud and Kumaraswamy 1993) in cellular networks.  
 
In the 3G mobile industry, there seems to be the lack of 
proper coordination among governments and mobile 
players. First, the lack of coordination resulted in 
market fragmentation. The European Commission for 
instance, allowed individual governments to make their 
own decision on 3G spectrum. Such move converted 
otherwise homogeneous European cellular market into 
different licensing regimes, networks and services 
(Wallage 2000).  
 
Second, cellular operators got into heavy debt because 
of expensive 3G licenses postponed 3G investments. 
For instance, Vodafone paid about £ 15 billion to 
acquire 3G mobile licenses in the U.K., Germany, Italy, 
Holland and Spain, which doubled its debt level to 
GBP 13.2 billion in November from GBP 6.64 billion 
in March 2000 (Naik 2000). Many operators asked 
governments to ease various requirements and reduce 
costs (Latour 2002). A petition signed by 2000 
European businessmen in April 2001 asked 
governments in Germany, the U.K. Italy and other 
countries to return 3G auction proceeds to operators 
and conduct new auctions (Ryan 2001).  
 
Third, the lack of government-industry coordination 
also resulted in supply-side crowd in the 3G industry. 
For instance, consider the European 3G cellular market. 
In September 2002, Germany had four 3G competitors, 
the U.K. had six, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and 
Italy each had five, and Spain had four (Latour and 
Delaney 2002).  
 
These problems are compounded by a lack of policies 
to foster 3G sector and unrealistic expectations from 
national governments. For instance, Hutchison faced 
problem in getting the building permits needed to set 
up base stations for 3G in Sweden. The Swedish 
government also specified the requirement of 3G 
coverage of 99.9% of the Swedish population (Latour 
2002).  
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